Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

University Graduate School

7-12-2012

Judging Psychology Experts: Can Judges and
Attorneys Distinguish Between Clinical and
Experimental Psychologists?
Shari Schwartz
Florida International University, shari.schwartz@fiu.edu

DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI12080609
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Recommended Citation
Schwartz, Shari, "Judging Psychology Experts: Can Judges and Attorneys Distinguish Between Clinical and Experimental
Psychologists?" (2012). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 685.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/685

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Miami, Florida

JUDGING PSYCHOLOGY EXPERTS: CAN JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGISTS?

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
PSYCHOLOGY
by
Shari Schwartz

2012

To: Dean Kenneth G. Furton
College of Arts and Sciences
This dissertation, written by Shari Schwartz, and entitled Judging Psychology Experts:
Can Judges and Attorneys Distinguish Between Clinical and Experimental
Psychologists?, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is
referred to you for judgment.
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.
_______________________________________
Lindsay C. Malloy
_______________________________________
Ryan J. Winter
_______________________________________
Howard M. Wasserman
_______________________________________
Nadja Schreiber Compo, Major Professor
Date of Defense: July 12, 2012
The dissertation of Shari Schwartz is approved.

_______________________________________
Dean Kenneth G. Furton
College of Arts and Sciences
_______________________________________
Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi
University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2012

ii

DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to the many judges and attorneys who have devoted their
professional lives to the pursuit and administration of justice. These individuals have
incredibly challenging jobs with enormous responsibility. After all, ensuring that our
legal rights are protected requires expert-level knowledge, in many subjects, that is far
beyond the scope of the study and practice of law. Acquiring such broad expertise is not
an easy accomplishment.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Obtaining a doctoral degree is an incredible undertaking and has been a wonderful
experience thanks to the support and guidance of my sage advisor, Dr. Nadja Schreiber
Compo. Her mentorship has gone a long way toward helping me to meet my academic
and professional goals, not the least of which has been guiding me through the
development of a full-scale dissertation project from a small, but important, research
question. This project will undoubtedly lead to much future research in judicial decision
making. I am so grateful for her support, guidance, and mentorship.
I also express my sincerest gratitude to Associate Dean Maureen Donnelly, and
my dissertation committee members, Dr. Howard Wasserman, Dr. Lindsay Malloy, and
Dr. Ryan Winter. These individuals graciously devoted their time and attention to
providing constructive feedback on my dissertation and it has significantly enhanced the
quality of my work.
Last, but certainly not least, I acknowledge the outstanding undergraduate
research assistants who helped me with data collection and data entry. They are Rafael
Meneses, Rosa Misrahi, Rachael Lundblade, and Lauren Lopez. Their valuable assistance
helped bring this project to completion.

iv

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
JUDGING PSYCHOLOGY EXPERTS: CAN JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGISTS?
by
Shari Schwartz
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Nadja Schreiber Compo, Major Professor
A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable
expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while
judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to
identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer
review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000).
However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts
are critical to preventing “junk” science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has
neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must
first evaluate experts’ CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether
legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore,
largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts’ credentials. Theoretical
models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to
process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were
expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a
lack of training in areas of psychology expertise.
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Legal professionals’ (N = 150) and undergraduate students’ (N = 468) expert
witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of
two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology
expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight
curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous
expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and
scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding
whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed
participants’ decision making processes.
Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality
psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more
confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher
than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology
expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate. Findings suggest
that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to
render decisions.
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Chapter I
Literature Review
The veracity of expert witness testimony and the role experts should have in court
proceedings have been the subject of debate for centuries. Expert witnesses have been
criticized for taking on the role of an advocate for one side or the other depending on who
has hired them (Anderten, Stalcup, & Grisso, 1980; Foster, 1897; Otto, 1989; Schetky &
Colbach, 1982). For example, when hired by defense counsel in a criminal matter, it may
become the mission of the expert to present scientific testimony that supports the
defendant’s acquittal and vice versa (Anderten, Stalcup, and Grisso, 1980; Foster, 1897;
Schetky & Colbach, 1982). Research shows that the existence of dueling psychology
experts has lead to monikers such as “hired guns,” (Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000; Gutheil &
Appelbaum, 1982; Homant & Kennedy, 1987; McCloskey & Egeth, 1983; Otto, 1989;
Swenson, Nash, & Roos, 1984) and “whores of the court” (Hagan, 1997). However, it
may be the case that biased expert testimony is unintentional (Otto, 1989). The expert
may believe that s/he has drawn unbiased conclusions on the basis of incontrovertible
scientific evidence. Moreover, the expert may believe that because s/he has been hired by
an attorney and appointed by the judge, s/he must actually be an expert in the area of
testimony. Thus, it appears that the quality of expert witness testimony may depend on
attorneys’ and judges’ decisions as to whether an expert witness is qualified to provide
testimony in a given area or subject matter.
One of the trial judge’s primary responsibilities is to serve as gatekeeper in the
courtroom to ensure that a defendant’s constitutional rights are protected during the legal
process. A key role of the judge-as-gatekeeper is to render expert witness testimony

1

admissibility decisions (Cutler & Kovera, 2011; Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera &
McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff, 2009; Vidmar, 2011). Judges’ initial expert witness
admissibility decisions are derived from experts’ curricula vitae that are submitted by
attorneys who have retained the experts. The inability of judges and attorneys to identify
whether a psychologist, for example, possesses the requisite expertise in a given area of
specialty could lead to allowing the psychologist to provide expert witness testimony in
an area in which s/he is not truly an authority. Importantly, allowing pseudo-experts to
testify on subject matter in which they lack authentic expertise is an egregious violation
of legal standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States as the standards are
in place to prevent junk science in U.S. courtrooms. If the judge allows the jury to hear a
pseudo psychology expert testify, jurors may assume that the psychologist is a specialist
in the subject area simply because the judge has allowed the testimony to be presented
(Schweitzer & Saks, 2009). This, in turn, could influence verdict decisions and may have
negative implications for the American justice system.
In the United States, judges’ expert witness admissibility decisions are governed
by the legal requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony. There are two distinct
legal approaches for judges to use, depending on jurisdiction, when assessing the
admissibility of expert witness testimony: the Frye standard (Frye v. United States,
1923) and the Daubert standard (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993).
Although judges in most states use the Daubert standard to guide expert witness
testimony admissibility decisions, it is important to note that some states, such as Florida,
continue to use the Frye standard.
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The Frye Standard
In Frye v. United States, (1923), the issue of expert testimony admissibility arose
when counsel for second degree murder defendant, James Frye, introduced expert
testimony on the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test administered by
psychologist, William Marston. Frye asserted that passing the test was proof of his
innocence, however, the court denied the motion reasoning that the test and the science
behind it were not “generally accepted” as reliable by the relevant scientific community.
According to the Frye decision, in order to determine whether a particular scientific test
and its results are generally accepted thus admissible, the findings and conclusions must
be generally accepted within its scientific community.
Although there appears to be some jurisdictional variation in what has since been
called the Frye test/standard, in principle the Frye test consists of a four-prong
examination when vetting experts. They are: 1) whether the witness is competent in the
field of expertise that s/he aims to address at trial, specifically whether the expert witness
possesses the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge, and/or experience from
which it can be assumed that the expert’s professional opinion or imparted information is
reliable; 2) that the expert’s testimony is based on a scientific principle or procedure
which is established and has achieved general acceptance among scientists in the relevant
scientific community; 3) that the expert’s testimony be useful in assisting the jury to
better understand the evidence in the case; and 4) that the expert’s opinions must be casespecific and relevant to the case before the court (Frye v. United States, 1923).
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The Daubert Standard
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), the plaintiffs (Jason Daubert
and Eric Schuller) sued the defendant (Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals) for damages
related to birth defects. The plaintiffs alleged that their birth defects were caused by
medication manufactured by the defendant. The drug was taken by the plaintiffs’ mothers
while each was pregnant. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals moved to have the case heard in
federal court because their expert witness submitted documents showing that no
published scientific study demonstrated a link between the drug and birth defects. The
defendant, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, moved for summary judgment of the case and
the court granted their motion (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993).
Eventually, the case made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States and
the outcome resulted in a new four-prong standard of admissibility for expert testimony:
1) that the judge is the gatekeeper in the courtroom and s/he must determine ultimately
whether scientific testimony is admissible; 2) the judge should rule as to the relevance
and reliability of the proffered scientific testimony (that is, the judge must find it more
likely than not that the expert's methods are reliable and are applied reliably to the facts
of the case); 3) the scientific evidence must be generally accepted by the relevant
scientific community such that it must be accompanied by a known error rate, subjected
to the rigors of peer review thus published; and 4) that the theory or technique is testable,
falsifiable, and refutable (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993).
It is important to point out that there appears to be a critical difference between
Frye and Daubert such that the latter does not explicitly state that it takes into
consideration the expert’s credentials; the four prongs refer only to the testimony the
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expert is to provide. However, the first prong in Frye refers directly to the proffered
expert’s skill, training, education, knowledge, and experience in order to conclude that
s/he is qualified to provide reliable expert witness testimony. It stands to reason that in
order to be an effective gatekeeper of expert witness testimony judges must take into
consideration the expert’s qualifications to provide testimony in a given area.
When applied to the context of psychology expert testimony, the legal standards
that guide judges’ expert witness admissibility decisions emphasize that the psychologist
should be competent/trained in his/her field of expertise and that his/her testimony
should be on information that is accepted by his/her scientific community. One important
fact neglected by past research, and arguably mismatched between Frye/Daubert and its
real-world application, is that judges are rarely exposed to scientific testimony of the
potential expert before rendering admissibility decisions. Rather, judges base their initial
admissibility decisions solely on potential expert witnesses’ CVs prior to hearing experts’
testimony. Similarly, attorneys often infer whether a potential expert is suitable for their
case from the expert witness’s CV. As such, legal professionals are presented with the
difficult challenge of inferring from those CVs whether legal standards of expert witness
admissibility are met.
There is evidence that judges do not always fulfill successfully their gatekeeperrole in keeping pseudo psychology experts out of the courtroom. Rowe (1992) recounted
an example of a “psychologist” who was retained as an expert witness in numerous
Michigan homicide cases. The expert’s role was to testify to various defendants’ future
dangerousness. Eventually, an opposing defense attorney conducted an investigation into
the “psychologist’s” expertise and found that the expert had earned a doctorate in music
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rather than psychology. Although it is a dramatic example, Rowe asserts that pseudo
psychology experts are retained and accepted as expert witnesses fairly frequently. As
such, it seems clear that judges and attorneys may require assistance in identifying
suitable psychology expert witnesses. An expert trained in an area other than that in
which s/he is appointed to provide testimony cannot possibly meet the criteria set forth in
Frye and/or Daubert. In order to help judges maximize appropriate judicial gatekeeping
regarding psychology experts, the process by which judges and attorneys determine
whether a psychologist is an appropriate expert in a given area of specialty must first be
examined.
Vidmar (2011) points out that the body of empirical research on judicial decision
making is incredibly small despite the crucial role judges play in meting out justice.
Schauer (2010) suggests that research should address whether, with regard to specific
legal tasks such as hiring and admitting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys differ from
laypeople in task performance and decision making. The author criticizes that much
empirical research on legal decision making is conducted on laypersons that do not have
experience rendering critical legal decisions. Consequently, it is difficult to generalize the
findings to judges and attorneys. According to Schauer (2010), without comparing the
performance of legal professionals to laypersons it is virtually impossible to determine
the most influential factors in legal professionals’ versus laypersons’ decisions. It may be
that attending law school, then practicing law, and then presiding over trials affects
specific and critical legal decisions, such as choosing and admitting expert witnesses, in a
divergent manner (Schauer, 2010) compared to laypersons without legal training and
experience.
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Empirical Research on Judicial Decision Making
Kovera and McAuliff (2000) examined whether judges were able to distinguish
between good and bad scientific psychological evidence, and whether this ability differed
depending on whether judges had previous scientific training. In their study, a sample of
judges read a description of an expert witness’s study on gender and stereotyping to be
presented in a mock sexual harassment trial. Judges were then asked to render an
admissibility decision. The researchers manipulated the peer review status and internal
validity of the study on which their stimulus expert witness testimony was based. In a
post hoc questionnaire, some judges in the sample reported that they had received prior
scientific and/or statistics training. Findings supported their hypothesis that judges with
scientific training were better able to distinguish between good and bad science than
judges who had no prior scientific training. However, only 17% of the total sample rated
the expert’s testimony as admissible regardless of the quality of the science. The
researchers concluded that rather than poorly conducted research being admitted, high
quality psychological science testimony is likely excluded in many cases (Kovera &
McAuliff, 2000).
Gatkowski et al. (2001) surveyed 400 state court judges from across the United
States to ascertain judges’ opinions of the utility of the Daubert criteria and whether these
enhanced judges’ admissibility decisions. Results showed that regardless of the
admissibility standard followed in the judge’s jurisdiction (Frye or Daubert), judges were
in support of their gatekeeper status as defined in Daubert. However, many judges lacked
the ability to define properly falsifiability and error rates, and assigned great weight to the
idea of general acceptance as a criterion for admissibility. The researchers noted that
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judges took their role as gatekeepers very seriously indicating that judges placed a high
level of importance on rendering sound decisions in the interest of administering justice
fairly and equitably. Nevertheless, if judges are not clear on the concepts of falsifiability,
error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Kovera & McAuliff, 2000), then
sound admissibility decisions made on the basis of the quality of the science are
jeopardized. Gatkowski and colleagues concluded that in order for judges to make
optimal admissibility decisions, they must have the ability to assess accurately the
information presented to them.
Faigman and Monahan (2009) point out an additional hurdle to judges being
adequate gatekeepers in preventing junk psychological science in the courtroom.
Specifically, the authors noted that the courts face a challenge in matching a psychology
expert’s qualifications, in terms of experience, with the substantive nature of his/her
testimony. Differences in state requirements in terms of licensing, certification, training,
and precisely what constitutes expertise in a given area make it especially challenging for
the court to determine whether a psychology expert is qualified to provide testimony in a
given area. Furthermore, a variety of psychology graduate degrees make it even more
difficult for a non-psychologist to ascertain whether an expert is qualified to testify in a
given area of psychology. Therefore, scholars have suggested that courts may rely on
previous expert witness experience to determine whether or not to allow a psychology
expert to testify (Faigman & Monahan, 2009), regardless of what type of testimony the
expert provided in previous cases. This suggests that judges may rely firmly on criteria
such as prior experience as an expert witness, which appear to be outside of criteria set
forth in Frye and Daubert. Importantly, Faigman and Monahan’s arguments imply that
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many judges base their admissibility decisions on their assessment of experts’ prior
experience testifying rather than their actual scientific and professional credentials. This
is an important consideration for the proposed study.
Empirical Research on Mock Jurors’ Expert Witness Perceptions
Empirical research on the influence of expert witnesses’ credentials on mockjurors’ decisions is more readily available than research on judges’ and attorneys’ expert
witness perceptions. For example, Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel (1996) examined the
effects of complex scientific testimony and the expert’s credentials on mock jurors’
perceptions. Expert credentials were varied based on prestige of the university from
which each expert obtained their degrees, the prestige of the university where each was
employed, the number of publications in their areas of expertise, and whether they had
served as a scientific journal editor. Both of the proffered experts worked in academic
settings. Factors such as university prestige, publication rate, and serving as a scholarly
journal editor were believed to be cues to expertise conducive to the use heuristics in
processing the information. Linguistic complexity of the testimony was manipulated to
elicit systematic processing. Importantly, the authors manipulated expert witness
qualifications in the form of experts’ credentials as opposed to the science experts were
testifying about.
A sample of community members serving as mock jurors watched one of four
videotapes of the expert’s testimony that varied in level of testimony complexity and the
expert’s credentials. When testimony was highly linguistically complex, participants
placed greater weight on the expert’s credentials in rendering verdict decisions than when
the testimony was less linguistically complex. The authors found that when the testimony
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was difficult to understand participants relied on peripheral cues to witness credibility,
such as the expert’s academic and professional experience, to render a verdict. When the
testimony was less complex, participants made their decisions based on the expert’s
testimony (central cue; systematic processing) rather than his credentials. Similar to
Kovera and McAuliff (2000), Cooper et al. concluded that their findings could be
explained by the theoretical models of information processing put forth by Chaiken
(1980; Heuristic-Systematic Model) and Petty and Cacioppo (1986a; Elaboration
Likelihood Model).
Although no study to date has directly compared judges’ and layperson’s
decision-making regarding expert witness testimony in the court room, the few studies
described suggest that judges may not be better than laypersons at discriminating between
poorly conducted and well conducted scientific research (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera
& McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008). These findings are troubling given that
judges’ inability to distinguish between good and bad research are typically part of highstakes legal decisions. Moreover, these findings suggest that judges may be unable to
distinguish between qualified experts and pseudo experts given their inability to identify
poorly conducted research.
Theoretical Models Used to Explain Judicial Decision Making
Although Kovera and McAuliff (2000) did not test directly formal psychological
theories of decision making, they suggested that judicial reasoning may be best explained
by formal models of information processing such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model
(ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken,
1980). That is, judges’ admissibility decisions with regard to psychological science
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testimony may be moderated both by their motivation to scrutinize the testimony and
their ability to analyze systematically such evidence (Kovera & McAuliff, 2000).
Similar to Kovera and McAuliff (2000), other researchers who have investigated
how laypersons make decisions regarding the veracity of expert witness testimony posit
that two major information processing theories can help explain their findings (Cooper,
Bennett, & Sukel 1996; Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000; Cutler & Kovera, 2011). They are the
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a) and the HeuristicSystematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980). Each explains information processing along an
elaboration continuum that ranges from implicit, unconscious, automatic processes to
conscious, explicit, controlled processes (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). For example,
automatic processing may be inferred if little cognitive effort is expended to process any
provided information. Controlled processing may be inferred when individuals exert
considerable cognitive effort to arrive at a decision. The factors that determine which
type of processing individuals are likely to engage include, but are not limited to,
motivation, ability, and the particular situation (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Petty, Wheeler, & Tormala, 2003). Because
the two models are relatively similar and make similar predictions both are discussed in
the next section.
Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. In a well-known dual-process
model of persuasion, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), Petty and Cacioppo
(1986a) describe the two processes as the central and the peripheral route to persuasion.
The central route to persuasion requires systematic, effortful cognitive processing
whereas the peripheral route typically entails automatic, intuitive information processing.
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The model has traditionally been applied to contexts such as advertising and politics such
that an advertiser’s ability to persuade consumers to purchase a service or product will
have a direct impact on generated sales revenue. However, it can also be applied to a
multitude of social judgment and inference contexts such as determining whether a
psychologist is an expert on a particular social science topic. According to researchers,
whether a person engages in intuitive versus effortful processing of a persuasive message
depends on his/her motivation, how personally relevant the message is to him/her, and
his/her ability to engage in effortful processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986b; Petty, Wheeler, & Tormala, 2003).
The researchers postulate that the two most influential factors in determining
which route of information processing an individual will take are whether the individual
is capable of judicious evaluation of the message (ability; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976),
and whether s/he has the desire to process the message (motivation; Petty & Cacioppo,
1979). Someone who engages in central route processing is more likely to have a high
need for cognition (i.e., they enjoy thinking about and reflecting deeply on issues;
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), and is less likely to be persuaded by peripheral cues such as the
attractiveness of an expert (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990).
Moreover, s/he is likely to scrutinize the information closely and, in the case of a judge’s
admissibility decision, will examine the expert’s key qualifications.
On the other hand, an individual who is either unwilling or unable to process
information on a deeper level is most likely someone with a low need for cognition
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). This individual is easily persuaded by qualities such as the
attractiveness of the expert and the perceived appeal of the expert’s message (Petty &
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Cacioppo, 1986a). Low need-for-cognition individuals may possess the ability to engage
in central processing but will do so only if there is some personal motivation involved.
Likewise, high need-for-cognition individuals do not always process information
centrally. They may use peripheral cues when the message is not highly important or
relevant to them. This may be due to a lack the motivation to use valuable cognitive
resources or a lack of ability to evaluate the information centrally.
Heuristic-Systematic Model of information processing. Similar to the ELM
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Petty and Cacioppo 1986b), the Heuristic-Systematic Model
(HSM; Chaiken, 1980) is a dual-process theory that explains how individuals process
information. The main difference between the HSM and the ELM is that the ELM posits
that there is an inverse relationship between central and peripheral route processing. For
example, as one type of processing increases, the other type decreases. However,
according to the HSM, the two types of processing can occur independently or
simultaneously.
One end of the HSM entails analytical, comprehensive processes that are referred
to as systematic processing. The other entails automatic, intuitive processes referred to as
heuristic processing. Individuals who engage in systematic processing will take into
account detailed source characteristics (i.e., reliability of the source), and the content of
the message to make a decision while exerting considerable cognitive effort (Chaiken,
1980). Heuristic processing places little emphasis on detailed information processing and
instead facilitates decision-making by using mental shortcuts based on availability and
representativeness while exerting little cognitive effort (Chaiken, 1980; Tversky &
Kahnemann, 1974). Research shows that individuals rely on heuristics to make decisions

13

when the issue under consideration is insignificant or irrelevant to the decision-maker
(Chaiken, 1980; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), or when the decision-maker faces a time
constraint that does not allow for systematic processing (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991).
According to Chaiken (1980), decision-makers relying on heuristics may accept
information that they may otherwise have correctly rejected had they engaged in more
effortful systematic processing.
Arguably, judges and attorneys are likely to score high on Cacioppo and Petty’s
(1982) Need for Cognition Scale and are, therefore, likely to enjoy engaging in
deliberate, effortful processing of information. However, research suggests that judges
must not be only be motivated to examine the information carefully (e.g., Chaiken &
Maheswaran, 1994; Petty et al., 1981), but also have the ability to adequately process the
information to engage in systematic processing (Ratneshwar & Chiaken, 1991). Based
on the Gatkowski et al. (2001) findings that judges lack the ability to define properly
falsifiability and error rates, and Kovera and McAuliff’s (2000) finding that judges keep
good science out of the courtroom, it appears judges lack at least one of the two criteria
necessary for the central route to information processing: the ability to evaluate properly
psychology expert witnesses’ credentials. Specifically, judges who lack the knowledge
thus ability to properly evaluate expert witness credentials (e.g., publication record, area
of expertise) may unduly base their decisions on peripheral, heuristic cues (e.g., expert’s
prior experience testifying). The current study, therefore, examined the relative
importance of central cues (expert’s area of training and publication record) and a
peripheral cue (expert’s prior testimony record) on judges’ expert witness admissibility
decisions.
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Judges’ Professional Expertise
It should be noted that legal professionals may not be in a position to evaluate
properly psychology experts’ credentials because they lack psychology
training/knowledge. According to Kahneman and Klein (2009), almost all professionals,
regardless of domain, are called upon to perform tasks that they have not mastered
perhaps due to a lack of exposure to the task or a lack of specialized training in that task.
Thus professionals possess what the researchers refer to as “fractionated” expertise. That
is, professionals may apply their knowledge and skills to certain aspects of their jobs with
great success, however, when they attempt to apply the same knowledge and skills in the
exact same way to other aspects of their jobs, the results can be suboptimal. Kahneman
and Klein (2009) believe that fractionated expertise typifies the essence of expertise
rather than signifying an exception to the rule of expertise. One problem of fractionated
expertise is that it may lead to overconfidence in decision-making on issues for which
professionals have little or no skill (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) as may be the case of
legal professionals distinguishing successfully one type of psychology expert from
another.
Shanteau (1992) examined good and poor work-related performance of
experienced professionals in many occupations and found that court judges, among
others, were particularly susceptible to rendering suboptimal decisions. Shanteau’s work
was driven by an interest in examining two contradictory schools of thought on expertise
development and experts’ decision making ability. One view is that experts’ decisions are
often flawed as a result of the biasing effects of heuristics on judgments. The other is that
experts’ cognitive functioning sets their performance above that of novices’ performance
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on every level. Shanteau developed the Theory of Expert Competence that incorporated
the views of both “heuristics and biases” researchers and cognitive science researchers
such that acquiring a level of expertise does not guarantee that professionals’ decisions
are flawless. Shanteau posits that experts’ competence depends on the task they are
performing.
Characteristics of tasks that are conducive to expert competence include
predictable, routine problems in which feedback, decision aids, static stimuli, and
objective analyses are available (Shanteau, 1992). Shanteau found that court judges are
among those who are routinely faced with unique tasks in a dynamic environment where
decision aids are rare, feedback is not readily available, and they expect to make few if
any errors in their decisions. Interestingly, he also identified clinical psychologists as
experts who were prone to errors in judgment and decision making. These findings
highlight that examining domain specific tasks in individuals who routinely perform
these tasks is critical in identifying barriers to competent task performance, such as
properly evaluating psychology experts’ credentials.
In addition to judges, the current study includes a sample of criminal trial
attorneys (both defense and prosecutors). Other than being a convenience sample as they
were more accessible than judges, attorneys were included because they are critical
decision makers in the process that allows experts to testify in a court of law. That is,
attorneys must first retain and submit a potential expert to the judge who then renders an
initial admissibility decision on the basis of the expert’s experience and credentials.
Attorneys are expected to perform similarly to judges when selecting possible expert
witnesses due to the similarity of their education and training. Specifically, their legal
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training and current professions have provided both groups (judges and attorneys) with
the motivation to choose potential expert witnesses wisely. However, their training may
not have adequately equipped them with the requisite knowledge to distinguish between
psychology experts’ areas of specialty. For that reason, legal professionals were expected
to rely more on peripheral cues to expertise, such as previous experience testifying, to
make expert witness decisions rather than relying on central cues such as the expert’s
area of expertise and publication record.
As indicated earlier, the current study is the first to examine legal professionals’
“gatekeeper” abilities when presented with ‘real-world’ material (expert witness CVs).
Despite the fact that legal professionals typically base their initial expert witness
decisions solely on experts’ CVs, research thus far has neglected including this type of
material in research on expert witness admissibility decisions. In most legal settings the
judge does not actually hear an expert’s testimony until an initial decision to accept the
expert has been made. Judges’ decisions, therefore, are likely based on information in the
expert’s curriculum vitae (e.g., the expert’s qualifications including whether s/he has
previously testified as an expert). Arguably, applying legal standards of admissibility
may be difficult when presented with material, such as a CV, that shows only indirect
indicators of general acceptance in the scientific community and/or falsifiability of the
expert’s research. It appears, therefore, that the extent to which judges can infer the
quality of scientific expert testimony from potential psychology experts’ CVs may be
directly related to the quality of their admissibility decisions. Moreover, the extent to
which attorneys can make similar inferences may predict the quality of their expert
witness hiring decisions and the quality of any cross-examination of the expert.
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The Current Study
The foci of the current study were to determine which cues (systematic/central vs.
heuristic/peripheral) legal professionals (judges and attorneys) would rely on to identify
an appropriate psychology expert for a particular criminal case, and whether they differed
from novices (undergraduate psychology students) in this ability. Specifically, I
manipulated and assessed the relative importance of a heuristic/peripheral cue (prior
expert witness experience) and systematic/central cues (expert’s area of expertise and
scholarly publication record) in their respective decisions. I further examined the relative
importance of the legal criteria for expert witness admissibility and legal professionals’
confidence in their expert witness decisions to determine which variables may explain the
underlying decision making processes.
To test the hypothesis that knowledge plays an important role in quality expert
witness admissibility decisions, the current study compared legal professionals with
individuals that have psychology training/knowledge (psychology students) relevant to
evaluating properly psychology experts’ CVs. Specifically, the ELM predicts that only
under conditions when legal professionals are motivated and possess requisite knowledge
will decisions be based on central, relevant information. In the case of expert witness
admissibility decisions based on experts’ CVs, the central route to persuasion should
include a consideration of scholarly publication record and area of expertise. The current
study allowed for assessment of the relative impact of systematic/central information
(area of expertise and scholarly publication record) compared to heuristic/peripheral
information (prior expert witness testimony experience). To assess the level of
motivation, participants complete a detailed post hoc questionnaire (Appendix C).
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Hypothesis 1. Judges and attorneys will focus on, thus be more likely to choose, a
psychology expert who has previous expert witness experience than an expert without
such experience regardless of the expert’s specialty (clinical forensic psychology vs.
experimental legal psychology).
Hypothesis 2. Judges and attorneys will be more likely to choose an expert with
a high scholarly publication record than an expert with no publication record regardless
of the expert’s specialty.
Hypothesis 3. Judges and attorneys will be most likely to choose an expert with a
combination of a high scholarly publication record and previous experience as an expert
witness than any other combination regardless of the expert’s specialty.
Hypothesis 4. Unlike judges and attorneys, psychology students will choose the
psychology expert whose area of expertise is the best match for the case regardless of the
expert’s publication record or prior expert witness testimony experience.
Hypothesis 5. Psychology students will choose the expert whose area of
expertise matches the case issues, has a high scholarly publication record, and previous
experience as an expert witness more frequently than any other combination, and more
frequently than will judges and attorneys.
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Chapter II
Method
Participants
One hundred fifty legal professionals were recruited through the National
Association of Judges and professional contacts across the United States. They were
criminal court judges (n = 79) and criminal trial attorneys (n = 81) who were asked to
participate in a study on “Judging Expert Witnesses.” They were predominantly male
(74%; 26% female), White/Caucasian (74%; 2% Latino; 24% no response), and ranged in
age from 36 to 80 years old (M = 59, SD = 9). Their length of experience as legal
professionals ranged from 2 to 43 years (M = 26, SD = 11).
Four hundred sixty eight undergraduate psychology students were recruited
through the Florida International University Psychology Department participant pool. In
exchange for participating in the study, students were given course credit through Sona
Systems, the Psychology Department Research Management system. The sample was
predominantly female (70%; 30% male), Latino (67%; 12% African-American; 11%
White/Caucasian; and 10% Other), and ranged in age from 17 to 45 years (M = 22, SD =
11). Most of the sample (32%) was in their junior year in college (29% Freshman, 16%
Sophomore; and 23% Senior).
Design
A between-participants 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal
psychology) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical psychology vs. experimental legal
psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no publications) x 2 (previously
testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified) factorial design was used. The

20

central dependent measure was a dichotomous decision in which “Yes, Dr. Jones is an
expert in the area of proffered testimony,” or “No, Dr. Jones is not an expert in the area
of proffered testimony,” were the only two options.
Other essential dependent measures assessed the frequency of correct expert
witness decisions, ratings of how likely participants were to choose the expert witness to
testify in the case provided, how confident they were in their decisions, and the extent to
which participants believed expert’s credentials met the legal standards of expert witness
admissibility. Those items consisted of a series of statements in which participants were
asked to rate their level of agreement with each statement on a 1 through 7 Likert-type
scale with 1 being “strongly disagree” and 7 being “strongly agree.”
Materials
Stimulus case. Participants were presented with one of two stimulus cases (see
Appendix A) that were summarized and modified versions of People v. Champagne
Smith (People v. Smith, 2004), an actual second degree murder case from New York.
The first version called for a legal psychologist specializing in eyewitness memory.
Eyewitness testimony was a central issue in the original case. The second version of the
case called for a clinical psychologist specializing in evaluating the defendant’s mental
health and was created based on the modifications made to the first version. This was
done in order to keep differences between the two cases to a minimum. As the
defendant’s mental health was a central issue in the clinical case version, defense counsel
needed to retain a clinical psychology expert. Modifications to both cases included
changing details such as the defendant’s name, witness’ names, the location where the
crime took place, when it occurred, the weapon used to commit the crime, and the case
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issues requiring expert witness testimony. Modifications were minor but were made to
make the case more general thus undetectable through internet searches. The case
summary was presented to participants in written form.
Expert witness testimony. General areas of proffered expert witness testimony
were provided to participants to ensure that they were aware that the expert must be
qualified to provide a particular type of scientific testimony (eyewitness memory or
mental health testimony). Expert witness testimony was presented in written form along
with the corresponding case scenario (See Appendix A). The legal psychologist’s expert
witness testimony was adapted from the original case (People v. Smith, 2004) and was
modified slightly to reflect current research in the area of eyewitness memory. The
clinical psychologist’s testimony was created to reflect empirical research on mental
health issues relevant to the defendant’s culpability in the case.
Curricula vitae. Participants were presented with one of eight curricula vitae
depending upon assigned experimental condition (Appendix B). Depending on the
version of the stimulus case participants received, the case called for either expert witness
testimony from an eyewitness identification expert or that of a clinical psychologist. Both
types of experts’ CVs reflected that they currently held university faculty positions. The
“matching” CV was that of the psychologist whose area of specialization matched the
provided stimulus case version. The “no match” CV was that of the psychologist whose
area of specialization did not match the stimulus case version. That is, no match occurred
when the legal psychology expert’s CV was presented in conjunction with the stimulus
case/testimony version that called for a clinical psychologist and vice versa.
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In the high-scholarly-publication-record condition, the expert had a list of 30
publications whereas in the no-scholarly-publication-record condition, the expert had no
publications. In the previously-testified-as-an-expert-witness condition, there was a line
on the CV stating, “Court-appointed expert witness in over 50 cases,” whereas in the
never-before-testified condition the line was, “No previous expert witness testimony
experience.”
Procedure
The study was administered via the online survey software, Qualtrics.
Participants received an email with basic information about the study. If interested in
participating, they were asked to click on a link allowing them to access the study. The
link was provided to legal professionals (judges and attorneys only) via email. It was
simultaneously provided to undergraduate students who were recruited to participate
through Sona Systems, the Florida International University Psychology Department
online research management system.
Upon entering the study, the first page provided a general introduction explaining
that participants were asked to read a criminal case scenario, view an expert witness’s
CV, and answer some questions. Participants were then asked to read the consent form.
Implied informed consent was given when participants clicked on the “I consent” button
at the bottom of the consent form page. Participants were able to exit the study at any
time by simply closing their browser window. Participants were assigned randomly to the
various experimental conditions.
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The next web page presented the assigned case scenario and expert witness
testimony. Participants were advised that they were about to read a criminal case scenario
in which the defendant was charged with second degree murder. They were further
informed that after reading the case scenario, they would be asked to view a potential
expert witness’s CV to determine if the expert was acceptable to testify in the case. Legal
professionals were instructed that they should approach the task as they would normally
in their roles as judges and attorneys. Student participants were instructed that they
should approach the task in the way they thought was most effective for helping them
evaluate the expert’s credentials. For all materials presented, participants had unlimited
time to view them and worked through the study at their own pace.
After reading the case scenario and proposed testimony, participants were
presented with an expert witness CV. After reading the CV, each participant was asked
whether s/he believed Dr. Jones was, in fact, an expert in the proffered area of testimony
followed by a series of questions about whether Dr. Jones’ qualifications met certain
admissibility criteria for an expert witness in that specific case (see Appendix C). Once
participants responded to all of the questions, they were directed to a page where they
were asked a set of demographic questions such as age, education, etc.
Upon completion of the experiment participants were directed to a debriefing
page and thanked for their participation. They were also provided the option to email the
researcher if they were interested in the study outcomes or in participating in future
research on expert witness testimony.
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Chapter III
Results
Analyses were first conducted separately for students and legal professionals.
Comparisons were then made between the two groups on their study responses. Since the
primary dependent variable in this study was a dichotomous variable (Dr. Jones is an
expert/is not an expert), the first set of analyses tested the effects of all four independent
variables on this outcome variable using logistic regression. The second set of analyses
also consisted of a logistic regression on the dichotomous outcome variable of whether
the expert witness decision was a correct match. The third set of analyses examined the
effects of all four independent variables on how confident participants were in their
decision to accept or reject the expert, how qualified they thought the expert was, how
knowledgeable and motivated participants rated themselves in choosing an expert, and
what aspects of the expert’s credentials were most influential in participants’ decisionmaking processes. These results were analyzed using MANOVAs.
Across all conditions and participants, Qualtrics effectively randomized the
presentation of the stimulus case and the curricula vitae. That is, each case scenario
(clinical psychologist required vs. legal psychologist required) was presented to all
participants with nearly equal frequency (M = 51%, SD = 50%). The curriculum vitae
matched the case scenario presented in terms of required area of expertise approximately
half of the time (M = 49%, SD = 50%).
Student Participants
Expert witness decisions. Approximately three-fourths of the student participants
judged Dr. Jones an expert (M = .74, SD = .44) regardless of whether the curriculum
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vitae matched the presented case scenario. For the purpose of this study, an expert
witness decision was considered “correct” when the participant either correctly accepted
or correctly rejected the expert depending upon whether there was a match between
required area of expertise and the case scenario or not. Specifically, if the case scenario
and area of expertise listed on the CV matched (eyewitness scenario and legal
psychology expert; or mental health case and clinical psychology expert), a correct
decision was to decide that Dr. Jones was an expert. If there was no match between the
case scenario and expert witness CV and the participant rejected Dr. Jones as an expert,
this was also considered a correct response. All other decisions were considered
incorrect. Students made a correct expert witness decision in 51% of the cases. That is,
they correctly accepted Dr. Jones as an expert in 35% of the cases, and correctly rejected
Dr. Jones as an expert in 16% of the cases.
Initially, data were analyzed using a logistic regression to determine the effects of
stimulus case, area of psychology expertise, previous expert witness testimony, and
publication record on whether participants considered Dr. Jones an expert regardless of
whether the stimulus case and CV matched in area of expertise. A test of model fit was
significant (χ2(4) = 36.70, p < .01) indicating that stimulus case (p < .05), previous expert
witness testimony (p < .01), and publication record (p < .05) all significantly predicted
whether participants would label Dr. Jones an expert, regardless of whether it was a
correct decision.
Subsequent post hoc comparisons revealed that when participants were presented
with the clinical psychology stimulus case, they were significantly more likely to judge
the doctor an expert (χ2(1) = 5.12, p < .05) than when presented with the
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legal/experimental psychology case scenario. Post hoc comparisons also revealed that
when presented with a CV that listed previous expert testimony experience, student
participants were significantly more likely to judge Dr. Jones an expert (χ2(1) = 20.04, p
< .01) than when presented with a CV that showed no previous expert testimony
experience. Finally, when participants were presented with a CV that listed publications
as opposed to no publications, they were significantly more likely to judge Dr. Jones an
expert (χ2(1) = 9.00, p < .01).
Table 1 includes the results for each of the variables that predicted significantly
whether participants judged Dr. Jones an expert regardless of whether it was a correct
decision. The effect sizes are reported as Exp(B) and show that participants who were
presented with a CV that listed previous expert witness testimony were 2.7 times more
likely to accept Dr. Jones as an expert regardless of the area of psychology expertise
listed on the CV. Publication record was the second most influential factor indicating that
participants were 1.8 times more likely to accept Dr. Jones as an expert when the CV
included a list of 30 publications compared to none regardless of whether those
publications were in the required area of expertise.
A second logistic regression was then performed to determine whether stimulus
case, area of psychology expertise, previous expert witness testimony, and publication
record predicted when participants made a correct expert witness decision. That is,
whether their decision reflected an accurate match of case and area of expertise. A test of
model fit was significant (χ2(4) = 14.41, p < .01) indicating that at least one of the
independent variables reliably predicted when participants correctly judged Dr. Jones an
expert. Stimulus case (p < .05) was the only variable that predicted significantly whether
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participants made a correct expert witness decision. Post hoc comparisons revealed that
participants presented with the clinical psychology stimulus case were significantly more
likely to make a correct expert witness decision (χ2(1) = 8.73, p < .01) than those
presented with the legal/experimental psychology case scenario.
Confidence in decision and likelihood of choosing expert. All participants were
asked to rate their level of confidence in their expert witness decisions on a 1 through 11
Likert-type rating scale with 1 being “not at all confident” and 11 being “completely
confident.” Across all conditions, students’ overall confidence was high (M = 8.19, SD =
1.82). Students were also asked to rate the likelihood that they would choose Dr. Jones to
testify on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being “not at all likely” and 7 being
“entirely likely.” Across all conditions, participants were highly likely (M = 4.95, SD =
1.44) to choose Dr. Jones to provide expert testimony in the case regardless of area of
expertise.
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high number of scholarly publications vs. no
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified)
MANOVA was conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a significant
impact on participants’ level of confidence and their likelihood of choosing Dr. Jones to
testify. Multivariate test results revealed significant effects of stimulus case, (F(2, 449) =
4.79, p < .05); previous expert witness testimony experience (F(2, 449) = 3.83 p < .05);
and publications (F(2, 449) = 5.35, p < .01).
Univariate post hoc comparisons revealed that participants who received the
clinical psychology case scenario were significantly more confident in their expert
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witness decisions (F(1, 450) = 5.27, p < .05) , and were significantly more likely to
choose Dr. Jones to testify (F(1, 450) = 8.16, p < .01) than those who received the
eyewitness memory case scenario, regardless of Dr. Jones’ area of expertise.
A univariate main effect of previous expert witness testimony experience on
likelihood of choosing the expert to testify was also found showing that participants were
more likely to choose Dr. Jones to testify when the CV listed previous expert witness
testimony experience compared to no experience (F(1, 450) = 6.35, p < .05). When
participants were presented with a CV listing publications, confidence in their decisions
was significantly higher (F(1, 450) = 5.08, p < .05), and likelihood to choose the doctor
was significantly higher (F(1, 450) = 9.65, p < .01), compared to no publications,
regardless of area of expertise.
Expert witness admissibility criteria. Participants were also asked a series of
questions about legal criteria for admissibility that judges use to determine expert
testimony admissibility. These items were adapted from the standards set forth in Frye
and Daubert and were formatted as statements in which participants were asked to rate
their level of agreement with each statement on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1
being “strongly disagree” and 7 being “strongly agree.” For example, participants rated
the expert on competence in the area of expertise proffered, and on possessing the
requisite skills, training, education, knowledge, and experience to qualify as an expert.
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified)
MANOVA was conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a significant
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impact on participants’ ratings on the 10 expert witness admissibility criteria items.
Results of the multivariate tests showed there was a significant effect of previous expert
witness testimony experience on the overall level of agreement that the expert met the
legal criteria for testimony admissibility, (F(10, 405) = 4.04, p < .01).
Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that participants were significantly more
likely to say that the expert had the required experience to impart reliable information at
trial when the expert’s CV showed previous expert witness testimony experience, (F(1,
414) = 20.70, p < .01) than when there was no previous expert testimony experience
listed. There were no other main effects or significant interactions.
Importance of expert’s credentials. A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs.
experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2
(high scholarly publication record vs. no publications) x 2 (previously testified as an
expert witness vs. never before testified) MANOVA was then conducted to determine
which, if any, of these variables had a significant impact on participants’ ratings. Results
of the multivariate test revealed a significant main effect of stimulus case on participants’
ratings of the importance of the expert’s credentials, (F(6, 425) = 3.67, p < .01). There
was also a significant main effect of publication record (F(6, 425) = 2.23, p < .05). There
were no other main effects or significant interactions among any of the variables.
Post hoc comparisons revealed that when presented with the clinical psychology
as opposed to the eyewitness memory case scenario, participants rated significantly
higher the importance of the expert’s educational background (F(1, 430) = 6.76, p < .05),
the expert’s previous experience as an expert witness, (F(1, 430) = 3.74, p = .05), and
whether the CV represented a typical expert witness CV, (F(1, 430) = 8.13, p < .01).
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Findings also showed that when the CV had a list of publications, participants were
significantly more likely to rate it as representative of a typical expert witness CV
compared to the CV without publications (F(1, 430) = 7.41, p < .01).
Participants’ motivation, knowledge, and ability. Participants also rated their
level of agreement with statements related to their ability, knowledge, and motivation to
choose an appropriate expert witness for the case. Ratings were recorded on a 1 through 7
Likert-type scale with 1 being “strongly disagree” through 7 being “strongly agree.”
Students rated themselves highly on ability (M = 4.45, SD = 1.33), knowledge (M = 4.43
SD = 1.33), and motivation (M = 5.04, SD = 1.30) to choose an appropriate expert
witness for the case regardless of which case scenario they received.
To determine what effect, if any, the study’s independent variables had on
participants’ ratings, a 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of
expertise: clinical psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high number of scholarly
publications vs. no publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never
before testified) MANOVA was conducted. There were no significant main effects of any
of the independent variables on participants’ self-ratings and there were no significant
interactions.
Legal Professionals (Attorneys and Judges)
Initially, data were analyzed separately for judges and attorneys following the
same analysis structure as the student sample. As predicted, results indicated no
significant differences between judges and attorneys for any of the main outcome
variables. Data were therefore collapsed across the two legal professionals’ groups
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(attorneys and judges) for all subsequent analyses. All data were analyzed following the
same sequence of analyses used for the student sample.
Expert witness decisions. Approximately two-thirds of the legal professionals
judged Dr. Jones an expert (M = .66, SD = .48) regardless of whether the curriculum
vitae matched the presented case scenario. First, a logistic regression was used to
determine the effects of stimulus case, area of psychology expertise, previous expert
witness testimony, and publication record on expert witness decisions. A test of model fit
was significant, χ2(4) = 15.66, p < .01, indicating that the independent variables reliably
predicted when participants would respond that Dr. Jones was an expert. Table 2 shows
that area of expertise (p = .01) and previous expert witness testimony (p < .05) predicted
significantly whether legal professionals would label Dr. Jones an expert.
Post hoc comparisons revealed that when Dr. Jones’ CV stated the area of
expertise was eyewitness memory, legal professionals were significantly more likely to
determine that Dr. Jones was an expert (χ2(1) = 6.67, p < .01) regardless of which version
of the stimulus case they received. Moreover, when Dr. Jones had previous expert
witness testimony experience, legal professionals were significantly more likely to judge
Dr. Jones an expert (χ2(1) = 3.63, p = .05).
Legal professionals made a correct expert witness decision in 58% of the cases.
That is, they correctly accepted Dr. Jones as an expert in 34% of the cases and correctly
rejected Dr. Jones in 24% of the cases. A second logistic regression was used to
determine the effects of stimulus case, area of psychology expertise, previous expert
witness testimony, and publication record on correct expert witness decisions. A test of
model fit was significant, (χ2(4) = 19.21, p < .01), indicating that the variables reliably
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predicted when legal professionals made a correct expert witness decision. Area of
expertise (p < .01) predicted significantly whether participants made a correct expert
witness decision. Follow up comparisons revealed that when Dr. Jones’ CV listed
expertise in eyewitness memory, legal professionals were significantly more likely to
make a correct expert witness decision (χ2(1) = 17.97, p < .01)
Confidence in decision and likelihood of choosing expert. Legal professionals
were asked to rate their level of confidence in their expert witness decisions on a 1
through 11 Likert-type rating scale with 1 being “not at all confident” and 11 being
“completely confident.” Across all conditions, reported confidence was high (M = 8.68,
SD = 1.81) overall. Legal professionals also rated the likelihood with which they would
choose Dr. Jones to testify on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being “not at all
likely” and 7 being “entirely likely.” Across all conditions, legal professionals were
highly likely (M = 4.46, SD = 1.98) to choose Dr. Jones to provide expert testimony in
this case regardless of area of expertise.
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (scholarly publications vs. no publications) x 2
(previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified) MANOVA was
conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a significant impact on legal
professionals’ level of confidence and their likelihood of choosing Dr. Jones to testify.
Multivariate test results revealed significant effects of stimulus case, (F(2, 135) = 3.94, p
< .05); area of expertise, (F(2, 135) = 3.57, p < .05); and previous expert witness
testimony experience (F(2, 135) = 9.74, p < .01). There was a significant interaction
between previous expert testimony experience and publications, (F(2, 135) = 14.28, p <
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.01). Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that when Dr. Jones’ CV contained both
previous expert testimony experience and publications, legal professionals were
significantly more likely to hire/allow Dr. Jones to testify than when either or both were
missing from the CV, (F(1, 136) = 23.89, p < .01).
Expert witness admissibility criteria. Legal professionals were also asked a
series of questions about legal criteria for admissibility that are used to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony in a given area. Participants were asked to rate their
level of agreement with each item on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being
“strongly disagree” and 7 being “strongly agree.”
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never testified) MANOVA
was conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a significant impact on
legal professionals’ ratings.

Results of the multivariate tests showed there was a

significant effect of stimulus case (F(10, 121) = 3.56, p < .01), area of expertise (F(10,
121) = 9.68, p < .01) previous expert witness testimony experience (F(10, 121) = 4.63, p
< .01), and publication record (F(10, 121) = 8.77, p < .01) on the overall level of
agreement that the expert met the legal criteria for testimony admissibility. Tables 3
through 6 list legal professionals’ responses to the admissibility criteria items and the
results for each independent variable on each of the legal criteria dependent variables.
Specifically, Table 3 shows the significant post hoc comparisons of the univariate effect
of stimulus case on each of the legal criteria items. Table 4 shows the same for area of
expertise, Table 5 shows the effect of previous expert witness testimony experience, and
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Table 6 shows the significant univariate effect of publication record on each of the
admissibility criteria items.
Multivariate tests also revealed a significant interaction between stimulus case
and area of expertise (F(10, 121) = 5.09, p < .01) such that when presented with a
matching clinical psychology stimulus case and CV, legal professionals were
significantly more likely to agree that the expert met the admissibility criteria than when
presented with a stimulus case and CV that did not match on required expertise. There
was a significant interaction between area of expertise and publication record (F(10, 121)
= 5.74, p < .01). Post hoc comparisons revealed when the area of expertise was clinical
psychology and the CV had a list of publications, legal professionals were significantly
more likely to agree that the expert met the admissibility criteria than when presented
with an experimental/legal psychology CV with no publications regardless of the
required testimony detailed in the case scenario. There was also a significant interaction
between previous expert witness testimony and publication record (F(10, 121) = 4.09, p <
.01) such that legal professionals were significantly more likely to agree that the expert
met the admissibility criteria when the CV listed a combination of previous expert
testimony experience and publications than when either or both was missing.
Importance of expert’s credentials. Legal professionals were asked to rate the
importance of the expert’s academic credentials, academic training, previous experience
as an expert, professional experience, and area of expertise when considering whether the
doctor was an expert. Ratings were recorded on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1
being “not at all important” and 7 being “extremely important.” Participants also rated
their level of agreement that the CV was representative of a typical expert witness CV.
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These ratings were recorded on a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being “strongly
disagree” to 7 being “strongly agree.” Legal professionals rated highly the importance of
specific area of expertise (M = 5.76, SD = 1.35), the area of academic training (M = 5.62,
SD = .84), the expert’s academic credentials (M = 5.26, SD = .87), professional
credentials (M = 5.21, SD = 1.22), and experience as an expert witness (M = 4.80, SD =
1.94), in their decision-making. They also rated highly their level of agreement (M =
4.27, SD = 1.65) that the presented CV resembled a typical expert witness CV.
A 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified)
MANOVA was then conducted to determine which, if any, of these variables had a
significant impact on these participant ratings. There was a significant main effect of
stimulus case on legal professionals’ ratings of the importance of the expert’s credentials,
(F(6, 122) = 4.34, p < .01), such that when presented with the clinical psychology case
scenario, legal professionals were significantly more likely to rate higher the overall
importance of the expert’s credentials in their expert witness decisions compared to an
eyewitness memory case. There was also a significant main effect of publication record
(F(6, 122) = 5.08, p < .01). There were no other main effects or interactions.
Follow-up univariate analyses revealed a main effect of stimulus case. When
presented with the clinical psychology case scenario rather than the eyewitness memory
case scenario, legal professionals rated significantly higher the importance of the expert’s
educational background (F(1, 127) = 13.54, p < .01. Legal professionals were also
significantly more likely to rate Dr. Jones’ CV representative of a typical expert witness
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CV when it included a list of several publications than none, regardless of area of
expertise (F(1, 127) = 5.13, p < .05).
Participants’ motivation, knowledge, and ability. Participants were asked to
rate their level of agreement with statements related to their ability, knowledge, and
motivation to choose an appropriate expert witness for the case. Ratings were recorded on
a 1 through 7 Likert-type scale with 1 being “strongly disagree” through 7 being
“strongly agree.” Results showed that participants rated themselves highly on ability (M
= 5.54, SD = 1.36), knowledge (M = 5.70 SD = 1.38), and motivation (M = 5.91, SD =
1.27).
To determine what effect, if any, the independent variables had on participants’
ratings, a 2 (stimulus case: clinical vs. experimental legal) x 2 (area of expertise: clinical
psychology vs. legal psychology) x 2 (high scholarly publication record vs. no
publications) x 2 (previously testified as an expert witness vs. never before testified)
MANOVA was conducted. There were no significant main effects of the independent
variables on legal professionals’ self-ratings and there were no significant interactions.
Comparisons between students and legal professionals
Expert witness decisions. A logistic regression was conducted to examine
whether there were significant differences between undergraduate psychology students
and legal professionals in their responses to the question, “Is Dr. Jones an expert?”
Results showed that there was no significant difference between students and legal
professionals in the frequency with which each identified Dr. Jones as an expert (M =
74%, SD = 44% vs. M = 66%, SD = 48%, respectively), regardless of whether there was a
match in area of expertise between the presented case scenario and the area of expertise
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listed on the CV. A logistic regression was also used to examine whether a difference
existed in the percentage of correct expert decisions between the two groups. There was
no significant difference between the percentage of students’ and legal professionals’
correct expert witness decisions (M = 51%, SD = 50% vs. M = 55%, SD = 50%,
respectively).
Confidence in decision and likelihood of choosing expert. A MANOVA was
then conducted using participant group (students vs. legal professionals) as the sole
independent variable to determine whether there were any differences between students
and legal professionals regarding decision confidence and the likelihood of
choosing/allowing the expert to testify. Multivariate tests showed there was a significant
difference between students and legal professionals in the level of confidence in their
decisions, and in the likelihood that they would choose the expert to testify (F(2, 613) =
14.43, p < .01).
Post hoc comparisons of the univariate effects revealed that legal professionals
expressed significantly higher confidence (F(1, 614) = 8.28, p < .01) in their decisions
than did students. In contrast, students were significantly more likely than legal
professionals to allow Dr. Jones to testify (F(1, 614) = 10.77, p < .01).
Expert witness admissibility criteria. To determine whether students and legal
professionals differed in their responses to the admissibility criteria questions, a
MANOVA was conducted. Results showed that there were significant differences
between legal professionals and students for each of the ten admissibility criteria items
(F(10, 563) = 20.58, p < .01).
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Univariate post hoc analyses revealed that students were significantly more likely
than legal professionals to rate the expert as competent in the area of expertise (F(1, 572)
= 13.85, p < .01); in possessing the requisite skills, (F(1, 572) = 27.57, p < .01),
education (F(1, 572) = 21.35, p < .01), and training, (F(1, 572) = 10.42, p < .01); in
possessing the requisite knowledge (F(1, 572) = 48.67, p < .01) and experience (F(1,
572) = 35.22, p < .01); and that the testimony was based on scientific procedures (F(1,
572) = 20.94, p < .01) and scientific principles (F(1, 572) = 6.80, p < .01). Conversely,
legal professionals were significantly more likely than students to report that the expert’s
testimony was beyond the knowledge of the jury (F(1, 572) = 53.78, p < .01), and that the
testimony was relevant to the issues and facts of the case (F(1, 572) = 17.40, p < .01).
Importance of expert’s credentials. A MANOVA was conducted to examine
any differences between the two groups’ ratings of importance of the expert’s credentials
and whether the expert’s CV resembled a typical expert witness CV. Results revealed that
there was a significant difference between the two groups (F(6, 580) = 18.17, p < .01).
Post hoc comparisons revealed that students placed significantly higher importance than
legal professionals on the expert’s academic credentials (F(1, 586) = 12.90, p < .01);
professional credentials F(1, 586) = 32.58, p < .01); and previous expert witness
experience (F(1, 586) = 62.33, p < .01). There was no difference between the two groups
on ratings of importance of the expert’s specific area of academic training or specific area
of expertise. Post hoc comparisons of whether the expert’s CV resembled a typical expert
witness CV showed that students were significantly more likely than legal professionals
to agree that it did (F(1, 586) = 15.00, p < .01).
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Participants’ motivation, knowledge, and ability. Results of a MANOVA
showed that there was a significant difference between the two groups on their ratings of
motivation, ability, and possessing the knowledge to choose an appropriate expert
witness (F(3, 581) = 32.44, p < .01). Post hoc comparisons revealed that legal
professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students on motivation (F(1, 583)
= 49.26, p < .01), knowledge (F(1, 583) = 73.69, p < .01), and ability (F(1, 583) = 93.10,
p < .01) to choose an appropriate expert witness.
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Table 1
Factors that influenced students’ expert witness decisions

95% CI for Exp(B)

B
S.E.
Wald
Df
Sig
Exp(B)
Lower
Upper
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Step 1a
Stim. Case
-.539
.221
5.977
1
.014
.583
.378
.899
Area of Exp

-.365

.219

2.768

1

.096

.694

.451

1.067

Testimony

.976

.227

18.444

1

.000

2.653

1.700

4.140

Publications

.604

.223

7.347

1

.007

1.830

1.182

2.833

__________________________________________________________________________________________
a. Variables entered on Step 1: Stimulus Case, Area of Expertise, Expert Witness Experience, Publication
Record
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Table 2
Factors that influenced legal professionals’ expert witness decisions

95% CI for Exp(B)

B
S.E.
Wald
Df
Sig
Exp(B)
Lower
Upper
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Step 1a Stim. Case
-.627
.407
2.379
1
.123
.534
.241
1.185
Area of Exp

.981

.379

6.712

1

.010

2.670

1.270

5.605

Testimony

.908

.400

5.158

1

.023

2.479

1.132

5.436

Publications

.700

.371

3.551

1

.060

2.013

.972

4.169

__________________________________________________________________________________________
a. Variables entered on Step 1: Stimulus Case, Area of Expertise, Expert Witness Experience, Publication Record
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Table 3
Legal professionals’ agreement that expert meets admissibility criteria by stimulus case
95% CI
Item
Stim Case
M
SE
Lower
Upper
______________________________________________________________________
Dr. is competent in the
field of expertise

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

4.852 a
4.393 a

.174
.152

4.508
4.092

5.197
4.693

Dr. possesses requisite
skills

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

4.710
4.483

.179
.156

4.356
4.174

5.063
4.792

Dr. possesses requisite Clinical Case
training
Eyewitness Case

4.800
4.694

.187
.164

4.430

5.170

4.370

5.017

Dr. possesses requisite
education

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

4.886
5.036

.198

4.493

5.278

.173

4.693

5.379

Dr. possesses requisite
knowledge

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

4.495
4.412

.180

4.138

4.852

.158

4.100

4.723

Dr. possesses requisite
experience

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

4.500a
3.871a

.189

4.126

4.874

.165

3.544

4.198

Testimony based on
scientific principle

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

4.952

.141

4.673

5.231

4.754

.159

4.440

5.068

Testimony based on
scientific procedure

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

4.744

.142

4.463

5.024

4.591

.159

4.276

4.907

Testimony beyond
jurors’ knowledge

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

5.652a
6.173a

.135

5.384

5.920

.118

5.939

6.408

Testimony relevant to
case

Clinical Case
Eyewitness Case

5.567a
6.014a

.149

5.272

5.861

.130

5.756

6.271

_______________________________________________________________________
a.

Mean difference significant at p < .05.
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Table 4
Legal professionals’ agreement that expert meets admissibility criteria by expertise area
95% CI
Item
Area of Expertise
M
SE
Lower Upper
_______________________________________________________________________
Dr. is competent in the
field of expertise

Clinical
Eyewitness

4.235 a

.155

3.930

4.541

5.139

a

.174

4.795

5.482

Dr. possesses requisite
skills

Clinical
Eyewitness

4.350 a

.159

4.036

4.664

4.925

a

.178

4.572

5.278

Dr. possesses requisite Clinical
training
Eyewitness

4.575

.166

4.246

4.904

4.976

.187

4.606

5.346

Dr. possesses requisite
education

Clinical
Eyewitness

4.890

.176

4.541

5.238

5.056

.198

4.664

5.447

Dr. possesses requisite
knowledge

Clinical
Eyewitness

4.288

.160

3.971

4.604

4.675

.180

4.318

5.031

Dr. possesses requisite
experience

Clinical
Eyewitness

3.917 a

.168

3.584

4.249

4.544

a

.189

4.170

4.917

Testimony based on
scientific principle

Clinical
Eyewitness

4.288

.160

3.971

4.604

4.675

.180

4.318

5.031

Testimony based on
scientific procedure

Clinical
Eyewitness

4.952

.141

4.673

5.231

4.754

.159

4.440

5.068

Testimony beyond
jurors’ knowledge

Clinical
Eyewitness

6.008

.120

5.770

6.246

5.786

.135

5.518

6.053

Testimony relevant to
case

Clinical
Eyewitness

5.871

.132

5.609

6.133

5.683

.149

5.388

5.977

______________________________________________________________________
a.

Mean difference significant at p < .05
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Table 5
Legal professionals’ agreement that expert meets admissibility criteria by experience
95% CI
Item
Previous Exp
M
SE
Lower Upper
____________________________________________________________________
Dr. is competent in the
field of expertise

Previous Exp
No Exp

5.000a

.167

4.670

5.330

4.245

a

.160

3.929

4.562

Dr. possesses requisite
skills

Previous Exp
No Exp

5.102a

.171

4.763

5.441

4.090

a

.164

3.765

4.416

Dr. possesses requisite Previous Exp
training
No Exp

5.241a

.179

4.887

5.596

4.252

a

.172

3.912

4.593

Dr. possesses requisite
education

Previous Exp
No Exp

5.262a

.190

4.886

5.638

4.660a

.182

4.299

5.021

Dr. possesses requisite
knowledge

Previous Exp
No Exp

4.959a

.173

4.618

5.301

3.948

a

.166

3.620

4.276

Dr. possesses requisite
experience

Previous Exp
No Exp

4.704a

.181

4.346

5.062

3.667

a

.174

3.323

4.011

Testimony based on
scientific principle

Previous Exp
No Exp

5.241a

.152

4.940

5.543

4.493a

.146

4.204

4.782

Testimony based on
scientific procedure

Previous Exp
No Exp

4.983a

.153

4.680

5.285

4.374

a

.147

4.083

4.664

Testimony beyond
jurors’ knowledge

Previous Exp
No Exp

6.054

.130

5.798

6.311

5.771

.125

5.525

6.018

Testimony relevant to
case

Previous Exp
No Exp

5.942

.143

5.660

6.224

5.638

.137

5.367

5.909

_____________________________________________________________________
a.

Mean difference significant at p < .05
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Table 6
Legal professionals’ agreement that expert meets admissibility criteria by publications
95% CI
Item
Previous Exp
M
SE
Lower Upper
_____________________________________________________________________
Dr. is competent in the
field of expertise

No Publications
Publications

Dr. possesses requisite
skills

No Publications
Publications

4.106a

.175

3.759

4.452

a

.154

4.707

5.314

4.058a

.180

3.702

4.414

a

.158

4.688

5.312

5.010

5.000

Dr. possesses requisite No Publications
training
Publications

4.548

.188

4.176

4.921

4.896

.165

4.569

5.223

Dr. possesses requisite
education

No Publications
Publications

4.617a

.200

4.222

5.012

5.219 a

.175

4.872

5.565

Dr. possesses requisite
knowledge

No Publications
Publications

3.836a

.182

3.477

4.195

a

.159

4.602

5.232

Dr. possesses requisite
experience

No Publications
Publications

3.821a

.190

3.445

4.198

a

.167

4.128

4.789

Testimony based on
scientific principle

No Publications
Publications

4.704

.160

4.388

5.020

4.990

.140

4.712

5.267

Testimony based on
scientific procedure

No Publications
Publications

4.597

.161

4.279

4.915

4.740

.141

4.461

5.019

Testimony beyond
jurors’ knowledge

No Publications
Publications

6.102

.136

5.833

6.372

5.771

.120

5.534

6.007

Testimony relevant to
case

No Publications
Publications

5.899

.150

5.603

6.196

5.708

.132

5.448

5.969

4.917

4.458

______________________________________________________________________
a.

Mean difference significant at p < .05
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Chapter IV
Discussion
The primary objective of the current study was to determine which factors
influenced legal professionals’ (judges and attorneys) ability to identify an appropriate
psychology expert for a particular criminal case. The secondary purpose was to determine
whether legal professionals differed from undergraduate psychology students in their
ability to identify a suitable expert witness for a particular case. In contrast to what was
hypothesized, students and legal professionals did not differ in how often they accepted
Dr. Jones as an expert. Neither did they differ in the ability to select a psychology expert
whose area of expertise was the best match for the case, regardless of the expert’s
publication record or prior expert testimony. It was also hypothesized that compared to
legal professionals, psychology students would choose an expert who had a combination
of scholarly publication record and previous experience as an expert witness more
frequently than any other combination. None of these predictions were confirmed. Most
importantly, there was no significant difference between the two samples in correctly
identifying an appropriate expert based on a match between area of expertise and the area
of testimony required for the case. In fact, both groups matched correctly the expert’s
area of expertise to the case only approximately half of the time (students, 51%; legal
professionals, 58%).
It was further hypothesized that legal professionals in particular would focus on,
thus be more likely to choose, a psychology expert who had previous expert witness
testimony experience than an expert without such experience, regardless of the expert’s
area of expertise (clinical forensic psychology vs. experimental legal psychology). Data
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confirmed that legal professionals were more likely to think Dr. Jones was an expert
when the CV listed prior experience testifying. However, they were also influenced
significantly by area of expertise. Specifically, only when Dr. Jones’ expertise was
eyewitness memory were legal professionals more likely to correctly match the CV to the
case. Additional hypotheses were that legal professionals would be more likely to choose
an expert with publications rather than an expert with no publications, regardless of the
expert’s specialty, and that they would be most likely to choose an expert with a
combination of a high scholarly publication record and previous experience as an expert
witness than any other combination regardless of the expert’s specialty. Both of these
hypotheses were confirmed.
Overall, findings show that both psychology students and legal professionals
demonstrated suboptimal ability when matching a potential expert witness CV with a
specific case. Interestingly, students’ matching performance was slightly better when
presented with the clinical psychology case scenario, and legal professionals’ matching
performance was slightly better when the CV presented was that of an eyewitness
memory expert. However, there was no difference in how often each group identified Dr.
Jones as an expert, regardless of whether there was a match between the area of expertise
required by the case and that of the CV presented. Moreover, there was no difference
between the groups in the rate of correct matches of the area of expertise required in the
case to the area of expertise listed in the CV. Importantly however, legal professionals
were significantly more confident in their expert witness decisions and ranked themselves
higher in motivation, knowledge, and ability to choose an appropriate expert witness
whereas students were more likely to allow the expert to testify. While students were also
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more likely to rate the expert significantly higher on the Frye/Daubert criteria related to
competence, education, and training, legal professionals rated the expert significantly
higher in providing testimony that was beyond the knowledge of the jury and that was
relevant to the issues and facts of the case.
Expert Witness Admissibility Decisions
Taking into consideration that the case scenario and CV matched approximately
50% of the time, participants were expected to be more conservative than they actually
were in judging Dr. Jones an expert. Although legal professionals (66% said “Dr. is an
expert”) were slightly more conservative than psychology students (74% said “Dr. is an
expert”), the difference between the groups was not statistically significant. Correct
expert witness decisions were made only approximately half of the time (students = 51%;
legal professionals = 58%). Legal professionals performed slightly better than students,
however, the difference between the two groups was not statistically significant.
These results are consistent with those of previous researchers whose findings
suggest that judges are not better than laypersons at identifying good science from “junk”
science (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008).
The present study extends the existing body of literature on judicial decision making such
that when reproducing closely the conditions under which admissibility decisions are
made, legal professionals appeared to under-utilize central cues to expertise such as
matching area of expertise on the CV and the case scenario, and publications. They also
appeared to over-utilize peripheral cues to expertise such as prior expert testimony
experience and/or having a doctorate in psychology regardless of the area of psychology
training/expertise. Despite the fact that psychology students appeared to use more central
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cues (number of publications) in their expert witness decisions, the use of these cues did
not translate into a better overall performance.
These findings are particularly concerning given that judges’ and attorneys’
expert witness decisions may be critically important to the outcome of a case whether in
criminal or civil court. However, the results are not entirely surprising given that legal
professionals, in general, do not receive training in the wide variety of areas of
psychology expertise. As such, any untrained individual would have difficulties
distinguishing between the various areas of psychology graduate training as well as
assessing the relative importance of area of expertise/training, number of publications,
and prior expert witness testimony experience. Instead, judges’ and attorneys’ decisions
appear to be based on criteria relevant in the legal arena, such as prior expert witness
experience.
As expected, when the expert’s CV showed previous expert witness testimony
experience, it was an influential factor in legal professionals’ expert witness decisions. It
is possible that this information may have overshadowed other and arguably more
important information on the CV such as area of expertise and publication record. This
may be attributable, in part, to the legal principle of stare decisis which holds that judges
are obliged to respect prior decisions of other judges. These decisions constitute legal
precedents and are typically related to case law. As such, judges’ and attorneys’ legal
training may predispose them to apply this principle to all legal decision making,
including retaining/admitting expert witnesses.
When presented with a CV showing that the proffered expert had testified in court
on several occasions, legal professionals may have deduced that many prior attorneys and
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judges accepted Dr. Jones as a psychology expert. Given legal professionals’ lack of
psychology training, they may assume that all psychologists receive nearly identical
training thus deducing that any psychologist who has previously been labeled “expert”
will suffice. However, psychologists’ training differs widely depending on the area of
study/specialization. Therefore, while following precedents set by other judges may be
highly useful for many decisions in the legal arena, when choosing expert witnesses it
facilitates the risk of repeating prior flawed decisions and on its own is not a safeguard
against preventing pseudo-expertise from entering the courtroom.
Legal professionals were also influenced significantly by area of expertise
indicating that stare decisis alone may not provide a complete explanation of their
suboptimal expert witness decision making. Although legal professionals’ decisions were
influenced by the area of expertise listed on the CV, they still made correct decisions in
only 58% of the cases. Interestingly, legal professionals were significantly more likely to
make a correct decision when the area of expertise on the CV was experimental legal
psychology, suggesting that area of expertise was considered under some circumstances.
It is possible that when presented with a CV showing an area of expertise
(eyewitness memory) that is not encountered as often as “traditional” psychology (mental
health) expertise, legal professionals performed better because they scrutinized the CV
more closely. According to Bargh (1984), novel or unexpected information/stimuli tend
to generate more conscious attention and are processed deliberatively rather than
automatically. In the context of the present study, legal professionals may have processed
more deliberatively the CV of the less typical eyewitness expert, thus linking more
accurately common features between the case requirements and the expert’s credentials.
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This finding also implies that depending on area of expertise, expert witness decisions
can be improved.
Despite the fact that psychology students receive training in the various areas of
psychology, in this study they were equally unable to select experts appropriately. That
is, they were unable to distinguish between an acceptable and an unacceptable expert.
Based on their training, it was predicted that students would outperform legal
professionals in matching expert witness CVs to a particular case. It is possible however,
that a more advanced level of psychology training may be required to distinguish
between areas of psychology expertise than existed in the tested student sample. In line
with this notion, and unlike legal professionals, students were more likely to make correct
expert witness decisions if the case required a clinical psychology expert. This may be
attributable to the level of familiarity undergraduate students have with clinical
psychology as opposed to a more specialized area of psychology such as legal
psychology. Arguably, undergraduate psychology students have more exposure to
clinical psychology as part of their standard curriculum and the popular interest in it.
Therefore, it may have been easier for students to recognize similarities between the
clinical case scenario and a clinical psychologist’s CV than the legal case and matching
experimental legal psychology CV.
Expert Witness Admissibility Criteria.
As expected, there was a significant difference between legal professionals and
students in their use of the legal standards for admissibility criteria when evaluating the
expert’s credentials and fitness to provide expert witness testimony. Compared to
students, legal professionals were more conservative in agreeing that the expert met each
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of the criteria. However, legal professionals’ level of agreement that the expert’s
credentials and testimony met admissibility criteria was still rather high (see Tables 3-6).
This cautiously suggests that judges and attorneys may have allowed/retained the expert
to testify despite the fact that in approximately half of the cases the expert’s area of
expertise did not represent a match to the case scenario. It also suggests that legal
professionals, similar to students, struggled with evaluating properly the expert’s
qualifications in accordance with the legal criteria for admissibility arguably because
applying or inferring these criteria from experts’ CVs may require training/expertise
beyond what legal professionals receive in law school. In fact, in could be argued that
inferring scientific quality from any expert’s CV may require an expert of equally
specific background or expertise who is familiar with the various academic degrees, areas
of specialization, and outlets of scientific work. The current data suggest that judges and
attorneys are rendering “accurate” psychology expert witness decisions only
approximately half of the time thus implying there is a high likelihood that pseudo
psychology expertise is making its way into courtrooms nationwide. These findings are
particularly troublesome given that the essence of the legal standards are to prevent false
expertise in U.S. courtrooms via granting judges the gatekeepers of the testimony that is
presented to the jury (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993).
According to prior research, there is another potential downside to suboptimal
expert witness decisions. Kovera and McAuliff (2000) found that judges admitted experts
in less than 20% of the cases indicating that rather than admitting pseudoexpertise/science, they were excluding high quality scientific psychology testimony. The
admissibility rate found in the present study is considerably higher, even if not more
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correct, which speaks to the importance of how expert witness admissibility decisions are
measured. While Kovera and McAuliff (2000) presented judges with scientific study
material, participants in the present study were presented with a CV from which to infer
or deduce whether the expert was in a position to provide expert witness testimony in
accordance with the legal admissibility criteria as set forth in Frye and Daubert. Given
that initial real-world expert witness decisions are typically made based on expert CVs
alone, the present findings indicate that past research may have underestimated the
frequency with which flawed expert witness decisions are made in actuality. The present
research is also a testament to varying methodologically how legal professionals’
decision making is tested to broaden the understanding of factors influencing legal
decisions as well as the policy implications of the findings.
Regardless of the actual rate of suboptimal expert witness decisions, any error in
this area is troublesome given that the court and all parties to a legal matter may benefit
from having suitable expert witnesses testify. The goal of such testimony is to augment
jurors’ knowledge to aid the jury in rendering a true and just verdict. Unfortunately, by
the time jurors are exposed to a pseudo-expert, it is unlikely that they will recognize
his/her lack of expertise in the area of testimony given that the court deemed the person
an expert (Schweitzer & Saks, 2009). If provided with expert testimony that is not
suitable in the given case, and/or denied quality expert testimony, jurors’ decision making
ability may be hindered. As a result, case outcomes may be affected adversely.
Confidence and Fractionated Expertise
Although legal professionals did not perform significantly better in rendering
suitable expert witness decisions, they were significantly more confident in their
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decisions than students. Judges and attorneys routinely evaluate expert witness CVs and
make expert witness decisions. Their experience may account for the high level of
confidence they reported in their expert witness decisions. The dissociation between
confidence and the quality of one’s own task performance is in line with past research.
For example, Marteau, Wynne, Kaye, and Evans (1990) found that experience in task
performance increases confidence, however, when there is no feedback provided on how
well the task was performed, skill/competence does not improve. The condition under
which feedback most significantly enhances performance appears to be when feedback is
provided immediately after an incorrect response is conveyed.
Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted, and Rohrer (2005) examined the impact of various
forms of feedback on associative learning and retention of information. The researchers
highlighted a controversy in the field as to whether feedback actually enhances task
performance as some research shows that it only improves performance during training
(see Bjork, 1994; Carlson & Gilmore, 2000; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992). However, Pashler
et al. pointed out that previous researchers provided feedback at the end of the learning
task rather than immediately after participants provided an incorrect response. When
varying the timing of feedback and retention interval on a word learning task, Pashler and
colleagues found that participants who received feedback (e.g., the correct response)
immediately after providing an incorrect response performed significantly better during
training than participants who received no feedback, or that received feedback at varying
intervals. This was especially true when participants were given time to process why their
own responses were incorrect. Moreover, participants who were given the correct
response immediately after providing an incorrect response performed significantly better
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than other participants in retaining the correct responses up to one week later.
According to Shanteau (1992), professionals (e.g., judges and attorneys) rarely
receive feedback on task performance. However, it may be that their performance on
certain tasks such as retaining/admitting psychology expert witnesses could be greatly
improved if feedback was provided whenever a suboptimal expert witness decision was
made. Judges may assert that feedback is not necessary given that, in theory, cross
examination of expert witnesses is a procedural safeguard against inadequate expert
witness decisions. On the contrary, the findings of the current study show that attorneys
render equally flawed expert witness decisions; therefore, they do not appear to be in a
position to adequately cross examine psychology experts. A thorough and effective cross
examination requires knowledge of the area on which the expert has been called to
testify. Current findings suggest that legal professionals lack a sufficient level of
knowledge in psychology to adequately evaluate a psychology expert’s CV.
Students, on the other hand, do not evaluate expert witness CVs on a regular basis
and that is reflected in the lower levels of confidence they reported in their expert witness
decisions compared to legal professionals. Moreover, undergraduate psychology students
may not feel completely confident when evaluating the credentials of someone who has a
higher level of education than they do. The current study required that participants
evaluate the CV of someone who had earned a doctorate whereas the student participants
in this study have not yet earned a bachelor’s degree.
Decision Making Theories
Although theoretical models of decision making were not tested directly, the
current study allowed for estimates of the influence of central versus peripheral cues on
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expert witness decisions. In the current study, central/systematic cues to decision making
consisted of area of expertise and publication record whereas a peripheral/heuristic cue
was the expert's prior expert witness testimony experience. Results showed that legal
professionals and students alike were influenced significantly by the peripheral cue of
previous expert witness testimony experience such that both groups labeled Dr. Jones an
expert when the CV showed previous expert witness experience. Both the Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model
(HSM; Chaiken, 1980) appear to support theoretically the findings of the current study.
Both models posit that decision makers must possess the ability/knowledge and the
motivation to process information using the central route (ELM)/systematic (HSM)
processing to render decisions. It was expected that legal professionals would rely on the
peripheral/heuristic cue of previous expert testimony experience to render their expert
witness decisions due to their lack of training in the various areas of psychology. Results
revealed that while legal professionals relied on the peripheral cue of previous expert
witness experience, they also relied partially on the central cue of area of expertise.
The lack of difference between the groups in rendering adequate expert witness
decisions, coupled with the primary influence of a heuristic/peripheral cue (previous
expert testimony experience) in choosing the expert, may suggest that neither group
possessed the ability/knowledge to complete this task successfully. However, given that
legal professionals’ “correct” decisions were significantly influenced by a central cue
(area of expertise) when presented with the eyewitness memory expert’s CV, this
suggests that they were capable of central/systematic processing under some
circumstances. It is likely the case, however, that a lack of motivation to process the
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information systematically is what underlies both groups’ use of a heuristic/peripheral
cue in rendering decisions. Because participants may have a mental prototype of what an
expert witness CV should look like, it may be that both students and legal professionals
relied on heuristics in an unconscious effort to conserve cognitive resources while
evaluating the information presented. Fiske and Taylor (1984) posit that individuals often
rely on mental shortcuts such as heuristics to evaluate information and render decisions
because they tend to be “cognitive misers.” Cognitive miserliness is not necessarily a
function of laziness but rather of the efficient use of one’s cognitive resources. Operario
and Fiske (1999) found that while the methods used by cognitive misers may be
successfully efficient, a major drawback is that suboptimal decisions often result from the
use of heuristics/stereotypes. The findings of the current study suggest that participants
may have approached as cognitive misers the task of evaluating expert witness suitability
such that they relied in part on a heuristic cue to expertise to render expert witness
decisions.
Participants’ self-ratings of ability/knowledge and motivation were high and legal
professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in these areas. These
findings are in line with Kahneman and Klein’s (2009) theory of fractionated expertise.
The researchers posit that an important problem of fractionated expertise is that it may
lead to overconfidence in decision-making on issues for which professionals have little or
no skill. Legal professionals’ lack of skill in rendering sound psychology expert witness
decisions, and high self-ratings of their ability and knowledge to do so suggests that they
may possess fractionated expertise. That is, judges and attorneys may have attained a
high level of skill in the theory and practice of law yet have not mastered all of the
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necessary skills required for their work, such as distinguishing between types of
psychology experts.
Limitations, Policy Implications, and Future Directions
There are some limitations to the current study that should be considered when
interpreting the results. Although the legal professionals who participated in the study
represented a “real world” sample, the stimulus case and CV presentations were mere
simulations. Specifically, the decisions made by participants in the study lacked the
consequentiality of the high stakes decisions that judges and attorneys make in their
everyday professional lives. Moreover, the study was administered online such that the
case scenario and areas of expert witness testimony were presented in written form via
personal computer. Actual trials typically occur in a courtroom with live testimony.
Therefore, there was only limited control over how stimulus material was processed. The
lack of ecological validity may have affected participants’ level of attention and
motivation. That is, participants may not have attended to and processed the material as
deeply as they may have in an actual courtroom in which they play a role in the outcome
of the case.
It appears that judges and attorneys have the ability to process systematically the
information on an expert’s CV but may lack the skill/training to process the information
accurately. Therefore, future research should focus on improving judges’ and attorneys’
psychology expert witness decision making. For example, it may be that simply
introducing a brief summary of areas of psychology expertise along with the case and CV
could enhance legal professionals’ ability to identify whether someone possesses the
requisite training, education, and practice in the area of testimony required. It may also be
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useful to develop a training module in which legal professionals are able to “practice”
matching psychology experts to various cases by area of expertise. By offering training
on the various areas of psychology expertise, then allowing legal professionals to apply
what they have learned to practice cases followed by critical, immediate, and consistent
feedback on their performance, legal professionals’ skill in this area may improve
significantly. The overall low rate of successfully matching the expert’s area of expertise
to the needs of the case suggests that legal professionals’ expert witness decision making
may be enhanced through additional training and/or performance feedback. Training on
the various areas of psychology expertise and providing feedback to attorneys and judges
on their expert witness decisions is likely to enhance expert witness decision making
ability thus improve attorneys’ ability to cross examination/challenge a proffered expert’s
qualifications.
Given judges’ responsibility as “gatekeepers” in the courtroom, it is critically
important that they be highly skilled in distinguishing “good” from “bad” expertise.
According to Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, the essence of Daubert and Kumho
is to exclude “expertise that fausse and science that is junky” (Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,
1997). Justice Scalia also pointed out that while judges have the discretion to choose the
manner in which they determine expert witness reliability, judges do not have the
discretion to perform their gatekeeper function inadequately (Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,
1997). However, in order for judges to perform their gatekeeper function adequately, they
must be provided with sufficient resources such as training on how to infer the reliability
of expert testimony through an accurate evaluation of the proffered expert's
qualifications/credentials. The United States Supreme Court has effectively determined
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that it is a judge’s responsibility to evaluate appropriately the credentials of individuals
whose education and training differs vastly from his/her own. However, this ruling does
not take into account the level of expertise required to sift through various advanced
degree specializations. Conversely, it would be equally difficult for a psychologist who
has not attended law school to evaluate the credentials of judges and attorneys. Therefore,
it may be advisable that judges consult with an objective third-party subject matter expert
who can advise them in this regard.
Faigman and Monahan (2009) asserted that courts face an incredible challenge in
matching a psychology expert’s qualifications to the substantive nature of his/her
testimony due to the sheer variety of psychology specialties. The faulty expert witness
decision making of the psychology students in this study suggests that even those who
receive some training in psychology struggle to distinguish between psychology experts.
Therefore, an important future research direction should also examine under which
conditions actual psychologists can distinguish between areas of psychology expertise. It
may be that graduate training in psychology should include educating students on
precisely what their area of expertise is and perhaps more importantly, what it is not. That
type of training may be the most effective means of promoting accurate self-selection of
future experts thus preventing pseudo psychology expertise from entering the courtroom.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Stimulus Case – Legal Psychology Expert
State v. Smith
Factual Background. At 2:30 am on August 5, 2009, a man was shot and killed.
He was 19 years old. Just prior to his death, he was walking down the street with a friend
when the perpetrator approached him from behind and shot him in the back of the head
killing him. Two eyewitnesses were crossing the street at the same time as the alleged
killer and were able to provide the police with a description of the man.
The witnesses described the shooter as a black man, approximately six feet tall,
with a thick nose and corn row braids, wearing a black, three quarter length pea coat style
leather jacket, a red shirt, dark jeans and black Timberland boots. The witnesses observed
the shooter walking with two other men, under streetlights, with a gun in his hand. They
saw the shooter approach the victim and either saw or heard him shoot the victim and
then flee. According to the victim’s family, they knew the defendant from the
neighborhood and they gave the police the defendant’s name.
Ten days after the incident, the police assembled a photographic lineup using a six
photo array. Separate lineup procedures were conducted with each of the eyewitnesses.
The witnesses were told that the perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup (thus the
witnesses recognized that one of their options was to simply state that the person that
they had seen was not present in the lineup). Each of the eyewitnesses picked the
defendant's photograph out of the lineup. The defendant was arrested, admitted to having
braids at the time of the incident, and admitted to being in the vicinity of the shooting at
the time of the shooting while wearing a black leather jacket, a red shirt, black sweat
pants, and black Timberland boots. The defendant was indicted on a variety of charges,
including Murder in the Second Degree.
In the weeks before the incident, the defendant had been working the overnight
shift but he was not at work at the time of the murder. According to the defendant’s
girlfriend, the defendant told her that although he matched the physical description of the
suspect, he did not kill the victim. Therefore, the defendant made a motion to be
permitted to present testimony at trial of an expert in eyewitness identification. The
defendant advised that such expert would testify in various areas: (1) the effect of
weapon focus on identification; (2) unconscious transference; (3) lack of correlation
between confidence and accuracy in eyewitness identification; (4) the effect of post event
information on identification; and (5) confidence malleability. After hearing argument
from the parties, the Court will allow testimony on the proffered five areas of testimony.
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Expert Witness Testimony
Dr. Jones will provide expert witness testimony on the scientific research below:
•

The Weapon Focus Effect. Weapon Focus refers to the focus or attention that an
eyewitness gives to a perpetrator's weapon during the course of a crime at the
expense of other to-be-remembered items or people. Weapon focus is a factor
affecting the reliability of eyewitness testimony and signifies a witness to a crime
diverting his or her attention to the weapon the perpetrator is holding, thus leaving
less attention for other details in the scene and leading to memory impairments
later for those other details.

•

Post Event Information (PEI) Effect. The PEI effect refers to the notion that
eyewitnesses’ recollection of an event is influenced by information, sometimes
incorrect, obtained after the event. Post-event information can be disseminated
inadvertently by co-witnesses and police through the use of leading, suggestive
questions and successive retellings of the sequence of events.

•

Unconscious Transference. Unconscious transference refers to the notion that
people can misidentify and get confused about the context in which they have
seen people and mistakenly associate them with the wrong situation or context.
Specifically, this refers to an eyewitness's misidentification of an innocent
bystander because of the witness’s exposure to the bystander in another context.
This can happen either before, after, or during an event.

•

Confidence and Accuracy non-Correlation. This refers to the lack of a strong
overall relationship between the accuracy of an eyewitness identification and the
confidence the witness expresses in such identification. Findings detailed in
various studies have shown that there is a lack of correlation between eyewitness
confidence and the accuracy of their identifications.

•

Confidence Malleability. This refers to the notion that an eyewitness's confidence
can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to identification accuracy such as
confirming feedback from the police officers (i.e., “Good job! You picked out the
right guy!”) and biased lineup instructions (i.e., failing to inform the eyewitness
that the perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup).
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Stimulus Case – Clinical Psychology Expert
State v. Smith
Factual Background. At 2:30 am on August 5, 2009, a man was stabbed and
killed. He was 19 years old. Just prior to his death, he was walking down the street with a
friend when the perpetrator approached him from behind and stabbed him in his upper
back killing him. Two eyewitnesses were crossing the street at the same time as the
alleged killer and were able to provide the police with a description of the man.
The witnesses described the culprit as a black man, approximately six feet tall,
with a thick nose and corn row braids, wearing a black, three quarter length pea coat style
leather jacket, a red shirt, dark jeans and black Timberland boots. The witnesses observed
the suspect walking with two other men, under streetlights, with a knife in his hand. They
saw the suspect approach the victim, stab the victim, and then flee. According to the
victim’s family, they knew the defendant from the neighborhood and they gave the police
the defendant’s name.
Ten days after the incident, the police assembled a photographic lineup using a six
photo array. Separate lineup procedures were conducted with each of the eyewitnesses.
The witnesses were told that the perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup (thus the
witnesses recognized that one of their options was to simply state that the person that
they had seen was not present in the lineup). Each of the eyewitnesses picked the
defendant's photograph out of the lineup. The defendant was arrested, admitted to having
braids at the time of the incident, and admitted to being in the vicinity of the stabbing at
the time of the murder while wearing a black leather jacket, a red shirt, black sweat pants,
and black Timberland boots. The defendant was indicted on a variety of charges,
including Murder in the Second Degree.
In the weeks before the incident, the defendant had been admitted to a psychiatric
hospital, stating that he felt detached from reality and “was not in his right mind” but he
had been released from the hospital at the time of the murder. According to the
defendant’s girlfriend, the defendant had a history of violent behavior, was a heavy
drinker, used drugs recreationally and always felt that others were ‘out to get him’. Her
boyfriend told her that he had been drinking the night of the alleged murder, remembered
seeing the victim and was not in control of his actions the night of the alleged murder.
However, he does not believe that he killed the victim. Therefore, the defendant made a
motion to be permitted to present testimony at trial of an expert in mental health. The
defendant advised that such expert would testify in various areas: (1) the relationship
between violent and homicidal behavior (2) the characteristics of psychotic episodes (3)
the characteristics and behavioral components of paranoid schizophrenia; (4) the effects
of severe alcoholism and drug use on paranoid schizophrenia symptoms; and, (5)
psychological factors that lead to diminished capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness and
consequences of one’s actions. After hearing argument from the parties, the Court will
allow expert witness testimony in the proffered five areas of expertise.
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Expert Witness Testimony
Dr. Jones will provide expert witness testimony on the scientific research below:
•

The Behavioral Correlates of Psychotic Episodes. Psychosis refers to a loss of
contact with reality, usually including false beliefs about what is taking place or
who one is (delusions) and seeing or hearing things that are not there
(hallucinations). Psychosis may be caused by certain medical conditions such as
alcohol and drug abuse, and brain diseases such as tumors, HIV and other
infections, and dementia. It can also be caused by psychiatric disorders such as
bipolar disorder, depression with psychotic features, and/or schizophrenia.

•

Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Effects on Mentally Ill Individuals. Alcoholism
refers to signs of physical addiction to alcohol and that an individual continues to
drink, despite problems with physical health, mental health, and social, family, or
job responsibilities. Drug addiction refers to the compulsive use of a substance,
despite its negative or dangerous effects. Individuals who suffer from certain
psychiatric disorders, such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia, are more likely
than others to suffer from alcohol and drug addictions.

•

Paranoid schizophrenia refers to one of several types of schizophrenia, a chronic
mental illness in which a person loses touch with reality (psychosis). The classic
features of paranoid schizophrenia are having delusions and hearing things that
are not real. With paranoid schizophrenia, the ability to think and function in
daily life may be better than with other types of schizophrenia. Paranoid
schizophrenia is a serious, lifelong condition that can lead to many complications,
including violent behavior.

•

The Relationship between Violent and Homicidal Behavior. This refers to the
research on structural brain abnormalities and dysfunction and the relationship
between brain abnormalities and violent, aggressive, and homicidal behavior in
particular.

•

Psychological Factors that Lead to Diminished Capacity. Diminished capacity
refers to the inability to appreciate the consequences of one’s actions and/or the
ability to act in a premeditated manner due to mental defect/disease.
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APPENDIX B
CV #1 – Clinical x Previous Expert Experience x Publications

CURRICULUM VITA
CHRISTIAN JONES, Ph.D., ABPP
Court-appointed Expert Witness in over 50 cases
ADDRESS
P.O. Box 110216
Naples, FL 34108-0104
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Postdoctoral Fellowship

September 2001
VA Maryland Health Care System
University of Maryland Medical Center

Ph.D., Clinical Psychology

August 1999
University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida

M.S., Psychology

University of Florida, August 1996

B.A., Psychology

Temple University, Philadelphia, August 1990

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
American Board of Professional Psychology-Diplomate
American Academy of Clinical Psychology- Fellow
Florida Psychological Association -Treasurer
Florida School of Professional Psychology –adjunct faculty
American Psychological Association- member
Florida Psychological Association-member
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
2004 – Present

Clinical Forensic Psychologist
Private Practice
Naples, Florida

71

1999 – 2003

Staff Psychologist
VA Maryland Health Care System
Department of Veteran Affairs Medical Center, University of
Maryland School of Medicine.

1999 – 2001

Postdoctoral Fellow in Clinical Psychology and Faculty
Veteran Affairs Maryland Health Care System
Baltimore VA Medical Center, University of Maryland Medical
School.

PUBLICATIONS
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Profile Associated with Committing Acts of Violence. Journal of Violent Criminal
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associated with decreased anger in substance abuse patients. NIDA: Washington, DC.
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Jones, C., Iacono, W. G., & Danielson, K. (2010). The identification of concealed
memories using the event-related potential and implicit behavioral measures: A
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APPENDIX C
Post hoc Questionnaire
1. In your opinion, is Dr. Jones an expert in the areas of proffered testimony?
a. Yes (Dr. Jones IS an expert in these areas)
b. No (Dr. Jones IS NOT an expert in these areas)
2. How confident are you in this decision?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
not at all
confident

70% 80% 90% 100%
completely
confident

3. How likely are you to appoint (hire/choose) Dr. Jones to testify as an expert in the
areas of proffered testimony?
a. Not at all likely (1)
b. Unlikely (2)
c. Somewhat Unlikely (3)
d. Neither Likely nor Unlikely (4)
e. Somewhat Likely (5)
f. Likely (6)
g. Entirely likely (7)
4. Dr. Jones is competent in the field of expertise that s/he purports to address at
trial.
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
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5. Dr. Jones possesses the skills necessary to assume that the information imparted
or the opinion rendered is reliable.
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
6. Dr. Jones possesses the required training to assume that the information imparted
or the opinion rendered is reliable
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
7. Dr. Jones possesses the required education to assume that the information
imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
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8. Dr. Jones possesses the required knowledge to assume that the information
imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
9. Dr. Jones possesses the required experience to assume that the information
imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable.
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
10. Dr. Jones’ testimony is likely to be based on a scientific principle which has been
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
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11. Dr. Jones’ testimony is likely to be based on a scientific procedure which has
been sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
12. Dr. Jones’ testimony is beyond the knowledge or perception of the jury.
a. Strongly Disagree (1)
b. Disagree (2)
c. Somewhat Disagree (3)
d. Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
e. Somewhat Agree (5)
f. Agree (6)
g. Strongly Agree (7)
13. Dr. Jones’ opinion is relevant to the issues and facts of the individual case.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Strongly Disagree (1)
Disagree (2)
Somewhat Disagree (3)
Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
Somewhat Agree (5)
Agree (6)
Strongly Agree (7)
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14. How important were Dr. Jones’ academic credentials in your decision-making
process?
a. Not at all Important (1)
b. Very Unimportant (2)
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3)
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4)
e. Somewhat Important (5)
f. Very Important (6)
g. Extremely Important (7)
15. How important was Dr. Jones’ specific area of academic training in your
decision-making process?
a. Not at all Important (1)
b. Very Unimportant (2)
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3)
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4)
e. Somewhat Important (5)
f. Very Important (6)
g. Extremely Important (7)

16. How important were Dr. Jones’ professional credentials in your decision-making
process?
a. Not at all Important (1)
b. Very Unimportant (2)
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3)
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4)
e. Somewhat Important (5)
f. Very Important (6)
g. Extremely Important (7)
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17. How important was Dr. Jones’ previous experience as an expert witness in your
decision-making process?
a. Not at all Important (1)
b. Very Unimportant (2)
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3)
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4)
e. Somewhat Important (5)
f. Very Important (6)
g. Extremely Important (7)
18. How important was Dr. Jones’ specific area of expertise as an expert witness in
your decision-making process?
a. Not at all Important (1)
b. Very Unimportant (2)
c. Somewhat Unimportant (3)
d. Neither Important nor Unimportant (4)
e. Somewhat Important (5)
f. Very Important (6)
g. Extremely Important (7)
19. I have the ability to identify an appropriate expert witness.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Strongly Disagree (1)
Disagree (2)
Somewhat Disagree (3)
Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
Somewhat Agree (5)
Agree (6)
Strongly Agree (7)
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20. I have the knowledge to identify an appropriate expert witness.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Strongly Disagree (1)
Disagree (2)
Somewhat Disagree (3)
Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
Somewhat Agree (5)
Agree (6)
Strongly Agree (7)

21. I am motivated to identify an appropriate expert witness.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Strongly Disagree (1)
Disagree (2)
Somewhat Disagree (3)
Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
Somewhat Agree (5)
Agree (6)
Strongly Agree (7)

22. Dr. Jones’ curriculum vita (CV) is representative of what an expert witness’s CV
should look like.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Strongly Disagree (1)
Disagree (2)
Somewhat Disagree (3)
Neither Agree nor Disagree (4)
Somewhat Agree (5)
Agree (6)
Strongly Agree (7)
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APPENDIX D
Demographics Questionnaires
Judges’ Demographics

1. Please tell us your gender.
 Male (1)
 Female (2)
2. Please tell us your age.
3. Please tell us the number of years that you have been a judge overall.
4. Please tell us the number of years that you have been a judge.
5. Please tell us the number of years that you practiced law before becoming a judge.
6. Please tell us whether you have ever received any training in psychology. If you have,
please tell us when you were trained and the length of the training.
7. Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check only
one)
_____ African American

_____ Asian/Pacific Island

_____ Caucasian: Non-Hispanic

_____ Hispanic

_____ Native American

_____ Other __________________
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Attorneys’ Demographics
1. Please tell us your gender.
 Male
 Female
2. Please tell us your age.
3. Please tell us the number of years that you have been an attorney overall.
4. Please tell us the number of years that you have been a criminal trial attorney.
5. Please tell us your area of practice.
 Defense attorney
 Prosecutor
6. Please tell us whether you have ever received any training in psychology. If you have,
please tell us when you were trained and the length of the training.
7. Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check only
one)
_____ African American

_____ Asian/Pacific Island

_____ Caucasian: Non-Hispanic

_____ Hispanic

_____ Native American

_____ Other __________________
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Students’ Demographics

1. Please tell us your gender.
 Male
 Female
2. Please tell us your age.
3. Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check only
one)
_____ African American

_____ Asian/Pacific Island

_____ Caucasian: Non-Hispanic

_____ Hispanic

_____ Native American

_____ Other __________________

4. What is the highest education level you have completed?
_____ High School graduate

_____ Junior year in college

_____ Freshman year in college

_____ Senior year in college

_____ Sophomore year in college
5. What is your current work status? Check one:
_____ Employed full time

_____ Employed part time

_____ Unemployed

What is your occupation? ____________________________________________
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